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ADDRESS
Howard M. Shapiro *
The FBI in the 21st Century
The following is a revised transcript of informal remarks delivered by Mr. Shapiro on
October 18, 1994, at a Cornell Law School forum sponsored by the Criminal Justice
Society.
I would like to speak to you today about the evolving role of the FBI
and the direction in which we are headed. I intend to offer a survey of the
most pressing challenges facing the FBI in the years ahead. Allow me to
begin by briefly explaining where the FBI is now.
There are FBI Agents spread throughout the country in fifty-six differ-
ent field offices, and in 400 smaller satellite offices of those field offices.
Cornell, for instance, is within the jurisdiction of the Albany Office of the
FBI. There are approximately sixty Agents assigned to Albany, three of
whom are assigned to the Ithaca Resident Agency. There are also twenty-
one FBI offices located abroad, which I will discuss later. In total, there
are approximately 10,000 Agents in the FBI. That sounds like a lot, and in
some respects it is a lot, particularly for those who fear a national police
force, but you have to place it in the context of the responsibilities of the
FBI. The FBI's geographic jurisdiction is coast-to-coast, and overseas in
some places. The FBI has wide-ranging responsibilities. Just for point of
comparison, the New York Police Department has 30,000 police officers
just for New York City, and there are another 10,000 police officers in the
housing and the transit divisions.
In terms of investigative jurisdiction, the FBI is responsible for
approximately 270 criminal violations. Some of these are the ones you
know: drug trafficking, organized crime prosecutions-using statutes like
RICO and interstate travel in aid of racketeering, bank fraud, assault on
federal officers, money laundering, and many others. I confess that some
of the 270 violations are not quite as weighty. Some of my favorites: Title
18, United States Code (U.S.C.), section 711a, addresses the unauthorized
use of the 'Woodsy Owl" emblem and slogan. So next time you are
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inclined to say "Give a Hoot, Don't Pollutel" think twice. There is also
Title 18, U.S.C., section 710, the unauthorized use, manufacture, or sale of
a military cremation urn. However, my personal favorite is the crime of
interstate transportation of a defective refrigerator.1 As you can see, the
FBI is responsible for quite a wide range of crimes.
As you know, while we don't see a lot of "Woodsy Owl" prosecutions,
there is an abundant amount of real crime out there, and the FBI's 10,000
Agents are spread quite thin. We are just now, for the first time in about
three years, being given the authority to hire new Agents. This will bring
us back up to our full strength, which is just over 10,000 Agents, after
enduring several years of tight budgets which resulted in a hiring freeze.
Director Freeh is also starting a number of initiatives to get more Agents
out doing what Agents should be doing- investigating crimes and per-
forming counterintelligence work, rather than sitting behind desks at
Headquarters. In the year since Director Freeh was sworn in, the number
of Agents in Headquarters has been reduced from 850 to 500. Those 850
Agents are being sent out to do investigative work in the field. This has
had a direct impact on my life because forty of those Agents who departed
were in what was the Legal Counsel Division, and is now the General
Counsel's Office, 2 the group that I head.
Similarly, in the Laboratory, the FBI is converting from Agents to
non-Agent professionals in the various scientific and technicaljobs. These
might not seem like significant moves, but they presage a breakdown of
the previous and enduring culture of the FBI, which was to some extent
shaped during the years ofJ. Edgar Hoover, when all positions of authority
were handled by FBI Agents. The lawyers were FBI Agents, the lab exam-
iners were FBI Agents, the people in the personnel, contracting, and
finance divisions were all Agents. The effect was to keep the FBI a particu-
larly closed and tight-knit society. Though there are some benefits to that,
we no longer have the luxury to use our limited Agent resources that way
in the face of the FBI's expanding responsibilities. Consequently, more
and more room is being made for non-Agent professionals, who, for the
most part, have been very well received.
Most of you think of FBI Agents as cops, and that's basically what most
Agents are. But in addition to the traditional law enforcement responsibil-
ities, the FBI also has significant counterintelligence responsibilities. We
are the lead counterintelligence agency in the United States. We are
responsible for safeguarding our nation against the threat posed by for-
eign intelligence services, who send people here to spy on the United
States. It is the FBI'sjob to thwart those efforts through a variety of means,
such as identifying the threat, stopping such operations through court-
authorized electronic surveillances or physical surveillances, and by trying
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1211 (1988).
2. The General Counsel's Office is responsible for providing legal advice and
counsel to the Director, other Bureau executives, and to the FBI Field Offices, litigating
claims brought against the FBI, and, often, representing the FBI to other agencies of
the United States Government.
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to recruit members of foreign intelligence services as double agents.
Those are things which were entirely new to me when I joined the FBI.
The only preparation I had for it was reading a couple of John LeCarr6
novels, which I actually recommend because it's pretty good preparation.
The world has changed quite a bit over the past five to ten years, and
the foreign counterintelligence area has been forced to change with the
times. The Cold War has ended. The communist governments of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union have collapsed. We no longer face
the obvious challenge between one set of countries and another, locked in
perpetual ideologically-driven combat. It is harder to identify who the
enemies are and who the targets are. That being said, the counterintel-
ligence world has also changed, but not quite as dramatically as one might
think. The best illustration of that is the case of Aldrich Ames. Rick Ames,
as you all probably know, was a CIA officer for many years, who was
recruited by and worked for the KGB. When the Soviet Union's KGB was
transformed into the SVR in post-communist Russia, they didn't miss a
beat. Ames continued to work for them, continued to supply classified
information, and continued to do great damage to American national
security issues. It is probably the single-most damaging penetration of the
United States Government ever, and it continued unabated until early
1994.
As the Ames case illustrates, the classic type of espionage activity is not
entirely a relic of the past, despite the tendency to think of it that way.
The motivations are slightly different. It is not ideologically-driven as
such, but there remains a substantial market for sensitive political, eco-
nomic, and defense information. Perhaps ironically, the end of the Cold
War has actually greatly expanded the number of espionage cases we are
working because of our greater access to certain types of information. We
now have some access to the files of the Stasi, the East German secret
police, and to some of the files of the other Eastern European secret
police agencies, as archives are opened and documents eventually find
their way to us. In addition, former operatives in some of these countries,
now that the ideological conflict is over, are willing to come and talk to the
FBI and other agencies. As a result, the end of the Cold War brought us a
tremendous increase in the number of leads in traditional espionage
cases, and revitalized others that had been dormant for years. However, to
some extent, this is a function of the transition from the former commu-
nist governments and will not continue forever.
What may be more enduring is a shift in what espionage is all about.
We see more and more of an interest in economic espionage, and this is
problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, it is difficult to define
what constitutes economic espionage with any specificity. In general, the
term refers to gathering by clandestine means confidential proprietary
economic information, trade secrets, or intellectual property. It was fairly
clear in the old days that when you had someone trying to steal the plans
for the stealth bomber or some nuclear missile, you had an espionage
case. However, it is far less clear whether or not you have an espionage
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case when someone is trying to obtain an unfair competitive advantage,
even if they are doing so on behalf of a foreign power. There are no
statutes that directly address the issue. There is no specific economic espi-
onage statute.
At the same time there is a deeper question, which we are not yet
prepared to answer. The question is: to what extent should the FBI be
involved in that type of law enforcement activity, since it puts the federal
government in the position of supporting and protecting private interests
and private corporations. There are obviously strategic dimensions to
such espionage, and our government certainly has a strong interest in
international competitiveness issues. The years spent negotiating bilateral
trade agreements, not to mention the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, are ample testament to the governmental interest. Also, most
other countries draw a less clear division between their public and private
realms, so these are not issues which can be left entirely to the market-
place. Still, the questions remain.
One other aspect of the shift to economic espionage is the change in
the people who are involved in it. It used to be clear who our adversaries
were. Now, many people who otherwise are friends and colleagues of the
United States in other activities are spying on us for economic matters. As
just one example, the FBI investigated a case in 1993 against two individu-
als, one of whom was French, the other Italian, for stealing sensitive eco-
nomic information from Owens-Coming Fiberglass. They attempted to
sell the stolen information to an FBI undercover Agent for $10 million.
There is a market for closely held economic information, and we at the
FBI are moving to get ahead of the curve on it, but it is much more amor-
phous and much less defined than the old-fashioned threats of espionage
between the warring sides of the Cold War.
There has also been, as some of you have probably read, occasional
tension between the FBI and the CIA. Some of that, I am happy to tell
you, is overblown and hyped. In some areas, such as counterterrorism,
there is a very constructive working relationship between the two agencies.
There have indeed been some problems in the relationship in other areas,
and some of them surfaced in connection with the Ames investigation.
President Clinton ordered a series of reviews to try and make the relation-
ship work better, and then issued a Presidential Directive in May creating a
national counterintelligence center that is staffed jointly by FBI, CIA, and
Department of Defense personnel.3 That order, along with several other
provisions, was codified in the recently passed intelligence bill. 4 One of
the intelligence bill provisions mandates quick handoffs from agencies
working internal investigations to the FBI, which handles any criminal
investigation on espionage matters. These changes are designed to ensure
3. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-24 (May 3, 1994).
4. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 3423.
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that any future case, unlike the Ames case, quickly receives the proper
attention of trained criminal investigators.
As the Ames case illustrates, counterintelligence work sometimes
shifts into the criminal area. At some point, if people are taking substan-
tial steps towards stealing or acquiring defense information or some other
types of classified information, that activity may end up as an espionage
case. So the line between counterintelligence and law enforcement is not
a bright one, but nonetheless, to some extent, they are distinct missions.
A related area is counterterrorism, where the FBI also has the primary
responsibility in the United States. Again, sometimes those become crimi-
nal matters, but we prefer to deal with terrorism as a preventive matter
rather than as a reactive one. It is obviously preferable to identify and
break up terrorist cells, possibly expel or prevent the entry of individual
terrorists and thwart their plans, than to respond after the World Trade
Center has been blown up. We do both sides of that, and have been suc-
cessful in the criminal prosecutions. For the most part, the FBI's
counterterrorism efforts are classified, which means you don't know about
them, and I can't tell you about them. However, you should be glad the
FBI's counterterrorist strategies are in place. Our record is actually very
impressive and the World Trade Center bombing is a rare exception as
compared to the high incidence of terrorist acts in many other countries
of the world.
Despite all of the activity that is ongoing in the espionage world, the
FBI's counterintelligence efforts have simply not been continued at the
same level of priority as they were during the Cold War. We are not pre-
tending that the world has not changed. In fact, we recognize that it has.
We further recognize that the FBI does not have enough people to do
everything it wants or needs to because of a finite number of Agents and
other resources. Consequently, we transferred a large number of Agents
from counterintelligence investigations to counterterrorism investigations,
which is, regrettably, still a growth field. As the Middle East peace process
yields tangible results, groups that are opposed to peace are stepping up
some of their activities to derail that process. In response, the FBI, here,
and to some extent overseas in liaison with foreign services, is working to
identify potential threats and prevent any further terrorist events in the
United States. There has been some success in this area: in 1982 there
were fifty-one terrorist incidents in the United States. In 1993 there were
only twelve, but unfortunately one of them was the World Trade Center
bombing.
The FBI also has jurisdiction overseas when there are terrorist acts
that victimize Americans. Pursuant to these authorities,5 the FBI investi-
gated and solved the Pan Am 103 bombing, although no prosecutions
have yet been possible. In the area of terrorism, the FBI acts within very
strict guidelines from the Attorney General, as well as internal guidelines,
to insure that there is no interference with activity protected by the First
5. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203, 2331-32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Amendment, even where such activity is in support of terrorist organiza-
tions. The bottom line on terrorism is that it is unpredictable, it is not
going away, and it is important that we retain our vigilance as we focus
more and more resources in that area.
This leads me to a second area of change in the FBI mission that I
want to talk about-our growing international focus. For many years,
criminals have thought in international terms, but law enforcement did
not. In limited incremental steps, law enforcement has begun to recog-
nize and respond to international crime. Drug enforcement got the
message pretty quickly, since, except for marijuana, the other major drugs
consumed domestically are grown almost exclusively outside this country
and are imported. Accordingly, the focus of drug enforcement quickly
went to international approaches and coordination with police activities of
other countries. The FBI has likewise worked cooperatively with foreign
police agencies, especially those in the Italian government, to combat
traditional organized crime. This international focus has taken longer in
other fields, and we are only now really catching up, but crime has very
much expanded beyond national borders. With expanding world markets
and the world economy, financial crimes now extend from one end of the
globe to the other. If you combine criminals who do not respect interna-
tional borders, with law enforcement that is entirely hemmed within them,
then you inevitably play at a disadvantage.
One step taken in order to address this disparity is a concerted effort
to think more globally at the FBI. In furtherance of this, the Director of
the FBI undertook an unprecedented visit in June and July to Eastern
Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union. This trip was designed
to assess first-hand the situations in these emerging democracies, what the
needs are, and to determine what, if anything, we can do to assist. This is
not just a program of charity, which concentrates on what we can do to
help these countries with their crime problem. The focus, instead, is on
what we can do overseas to help our own crime problem, since much of it
is generated overseas, where criminals have safe havens to plan their
crimes and reap the benefits well beyond the reach of domestic law
enforcement. The FBI already operates in twenty-one countries around
the world in a liaison capacity. We don't have Agents running around the
streets of Paris or London with guns and badges, arresting people. What
we have are Agents who will make contact with Scotland Yard or with the
French police and work collaboratively to try to focus on some of the inter-
national criminals that both countries are investigating.
Let me tell you a little something about this trip to Eastern Europe. I
was privileged to go on this trip with the Director, along with the Adminis-
trator of the DEA, the Undersecretary of Treasury for Law Enforcement,
the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, and a
small support staff. We met with representatives from eleven countries in
nine days. We started in Germany, and went through Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, met with the Lithuanians, Latvians,
and Estonians all in Vilnius, and then spent two and one-half days in Rus-
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sia before ending in Austria. It was a grueling pace, but it was extremely
informative and educational. There are critical problems for law enforce-
ment in most of these countries. It is not just, as I said, a problem for
them, but it is really a problem for us as well. In these countries, the esca-
lating crime problem directly affects the ability of their governments to
build stable democracies-something which the United States Govern-
ment has been supporting both diplomatically and financially, through
fairly significant contributions of cash. Much of the progress we have seen
in these emerging democracies is threatened by the emerging chaos
caused by criminal activity. As the borders have opened, and more trade
has commenced between these countries and the United States, the crime
rates have soared and reached our own borders, as criminals in these
countries have learned to take advantage of the new opportunities created
by free trade and open markets.
The criminal issues in most of these places are pretty much the same
as they are here. There is concern about terrorism. There is concern
about drug trafficking, organized crime, financial fraud, and newly devel-
oping concerns regarding nuclear materials, which I will discuss later.
The ability of these countries to respond to any of these threats is quite
questionable. There is a need, a basic need, in all of the former Eastern
European countries and states of the Soviet Union to learn how to develop
and administer effective law enforcement agencies in a democratic society.
It is a lot easier to be a cop in a totalitarian regime than it is in a democ-
racy where law enforcement must respect constitutional rights and proce-
dural protections, yet still be able to accomplish its mission.
Everywhere we went, we were asked how government can balance
those competing interests. Now, we made no pretense of having solved
our own crime problem, or having stopped the flow of illegal drugs. Nev-
ertheless, we did have something to offer. On the law enforcement side,
many of these countries have absolutely no relevant experience. The
countries have tended to take one of two approaches, epitomized by, say,
the Czech Republic on one side and the Russians or Latvians on another.
The Czech Republic, because of years of being subject to the repression of
their internal police forces, purged these forces entirely. The police
forces, the counterintelligence services, and the foreign intelligence serv-
ices were entirely overhauled, and they now have law enforcement officials
they can trust. The head of the national police was a rock drummer dur-
ing the former regime. The Minister of the Interior was a poet. These are
thoughtful, educated, smart people. However, they don't know a thing
about law enforcement, and it is going to take some time for them to
develop the relevant experiences and expertise. There are some tech-
niques, there are some experiences, that can be learned, and that is why,
when we were in Prague, President Havel asked us to open an FBI office
there to help train their police officers. It is a problem in a place like the
Czech Republic where nobody who's on the job knows the craft of
policing.
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It may be a bigger problem in places like Russia and Latvia where they
know only too well how to police aggressively, because the exact same offi-"
cials who were acting in utterly repressive ways under the former regimes
are still in power. There has been essentially no turnover in the person-
nel. One quick story illustrates the prevailing attitude.
When we met with the Baltic states, in Vilnius, I was asked to address a
question posed by the Minister of Interior from Lithuania about the prin-
ciples of law enforcement in the United States. I spoke for a few minutes
about aggressively enforcing criminal laws within very carefully crafted and
honored procedural protections. I talked about the right to a jury trial,
the right to counsel, the fourth amendment protections against unreason-
able search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination. I
presented a quick survey of American criminal procedure, from the per-
spective of the FBI, which the New York Times refers to as a notoriously
conservative institution.
It seemed to be well received at the time, but the next morning we got
what amounted to an official diplomatic protest from the Latvians,
because they felt that I was advocating the coddling of criminals and sug-
gesting procedures which would totally undermine the possibility for effec-
tive law enforcement. In comparison to what they are used to, perhaps I
was-which should suggest to you that there is a tremendous gulf between
our experiences. We all know that, but it is nonetheless enlightening to sit
down and address the question of how to exercise law enforcement powers
in-newly free societies. Our experience suggests that an independentjudi-
ciary is one essential element, as are strong internal controls within police
institutions.
The problems facing these countries are significantly exacerbated by
the fact that these are, for the most part, poor countries. On one of our
stops, the police talked about having to hail down a cab when they try to
follow somebody on a surveillance because they don't have enough cars
for their cops. They don't have phones, they don't have computers, and
they get paid very little. This last point is of particular concern, aside from
some general sense of the brotherhood of law enforcement officers,
because it creates fertile ground for corruption. In Estonia, a cop gets the
equivalent of $70 per month. And even in Russia, at the MVD, which is
the top-flight national police, the pay reaches only about $200 per month.
At the same time, elements of the emergent organized crime groups in
Eastern Europe and in Russia are able to pay many multiples of that, even
if it's just for someone to look the other way. So the shortage of resources
raises additional hurdles to any lasting and effective reform.
Perhaps the biggest problem facing law enforcement in these coun-
tries is the way the police are perceived by the public. This perception
problem is grounded very firmly in a historical reality-law enforcement
was the enemy. Throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, the experience of most people with law enforcement is entirely
negative. I recognize that this is also the experience of some people in
this country, but again, the differences in the experiences can hardly be
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overstated. Under the repressive Stalinist regime, law enforcement could
arbitrarily come into your home, destroy your family, and imprison or kill
your loved ones. Law enforcement was answerable to no one and com-
pletely unreachable. Attitudes toward the police which formed and hard-
ened over time will change only slowly and will require a drastic change in
the behavior of the police. Regrettably, we observed that the fear of the
populace was often met by a total lack of respect for the citizenry from
certain elements among the police.
That being said, what do we do about it? We don't have any magic
solutions to any of these problems, but we at the FBI think there is no
alternative to our trying to do something about it. Every country we visited
asked for help. Most of all they asked us to station FBI Agents in their
country. I fear that they often misunderstood and vastly overestimated
what one or two Agents placed in a country would be able to do. We have
neither the resources, the intentions, nor the authority to take over the
law enforcement activities of any of these countries; we have enough chal-
lenges at home. We are, however, looking toward stationing a limited
number of Agents in some of these countries to help coordinate investiga-
tive activities and also to facilitate training.
One can hardly overestimate the enormity of the task involved in
remaking these law enforcement agencies and, in comparison, how lim-
ited our resources are. We can't train the entire MVD in Russia or even
the Czech Republic police force. But we are moving toward establishing a
training academy in Europe that will enable us to train trainers.6 Our goal
is to train mid-level trainers who can go back and teach in their own coun-
tries. This has the advantage not only of providing some training as well as
an inculcation in democratic law enforcement techniques, but also pro-
vides opportunities to identify people in these countries who are commit-
ted to doing the right things for the right reasons and on whom we can
rely.
At the same time, we are looking toward negotiating mutual legal
assistance treaties with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The
Department of Justice has such treaties, which provide procedures to
share evidence and facilitate cooperative law enforcement, with many
countries in the world, but not at present with any of the countries of
Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. As a result, it takes extraordi-
nary effort to accomplish something as simple as getting a witness or some
evidence from one of these countries to use in a trial here. This absence
of legal process further insulates these countries and enhances their status
as safe havens for criminals. There is not only no extradition procedure,
but typically you cannot even get the documents from countries where the
crimes may have been planned and initiated.
6. On December 5, 1994, President Clinton announced that an International Law
Enforcement Academy, to be located in Budapest, Hungary, will begin training classes
in the spring of 1995.
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We are now moving forward on all of these fronts, as the stakes are
too high for us to ignore these concerns. Russia in particular presents a
unique situation in the world. For the first time we face a major nuclear
power which is an unstable state. We are starting to see some movement
of very small quantities, and for the most part, low purities of nuclear
material coming out of Russia and other places in the former Soviet
Union. But it is a threat that we, and police forces in Western Europe,
take extremely seriously. You have to keep in mind that the security sys-
tems for nuclear materials in what was the Soviet Union were designed to
work in a country that had an effective totalitarian system of control, and
had impermeable borders. Once they lost both of those, the security sys-
tem intended to safeguard against a nuclear mishap was seriously compro-
mised. This is' not merely a law enforcement problem; it's also a
diplomatic problem and an intelligence problem. But law enforcement
must continue to play a role in combatting the growing danger of the
dissemination of nuclear materials.
Some of the crimes that the FBI now faces, and will continue to face,
are the same ones we've been facing for a long time: bank robberies,
kidnappings, and espionage. Others are still emerging and we have, so
far, been able to modify our approach and reallocate our resources to stay
ahead of the evolving nature of crime, which is where we are committed to
staying. Today, we are again changing our approach. We are thinking
much more internationally, indeed globally, while we are also taking
advantage of new advanced forensic technologies, such as DNA identifica-
tion and others developed by the FBI Laboratory. We are identifying the
emerging technological hurdles to effective law enforcement and over-
coming them before they become a real problem. We are also working
more and more closely with other law enforcement agencies both in the
United States and abroad to ensure that we anticipate and respond effec-
tively to the evolving nature of crime.
The FBI and our global law enforcement concerns and interests are
also becoming more integrated into the foreign policy of the United
States. Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke gave a speech while we were
in Eastern Europe where he said,
[t]his trip symbolizes the transition from Cold War politics to the far more
difficult issues of the post-war world. People ask, where is the post-war for-
eign policy. The CIA and Defense Department issues that predominated
during the Cold War have receded. Now law enforcement is at the fore-
front of the national interest in this part of the world and this is the evolving
America foreign policy.7
The FBI and the Department ofJustice are committed to making this
evolving policy as effective as possible. The problems are simply too big
and too serious to ignore.
7. Remarks of the Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke, then United States Ambassa-
dor to the Federal Republic of Germany, at Rotes Rathaus (Berlin City Hall), Berlin,
Germany (June 28, 1994).
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